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THE COMMON LAW GENIUS OF THE WARREN COURT
DAVID A. STRAUSS*
Abstract
The Warren Court's most important decisions-on school
segregation,reapportionment,free speech, and criminalprocedureare firmly entrenched in the law. But the idea persists, even among
those who are sympathetic to the results that the Warren Court
reached, that what the Warren Court was doing was somehow not
really law: that the Warren Court "made it up," and that the
important Warren Court decisions cannot be justified by reference to
conventional legal materials.
It is true that the Warren Court's most importantdecisions cannot
be easily justified on the basis of the text of the Constitution or the
original understandings.But in its major constitutionaldecisions,
the Warren Court was, in a deep sense, a common law court. The
decisions in Brown v. Board of Education,' Gideon v. Wainwright,2
Miranda v. Arizona, 3 and even in the reapportionmentcases all can
be justified as common law decisions. The Warren Court's decisions
in these areas resemble the paradigm examples of innovation in the
common law, such as Cardozo's decision in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.4
In all of those areas, the Warren Court, although it was
innovating,did so in a way that was justified by lessons drawn from
precedents. And the Warren Court's decisions were consistent with
the presuppositions of a common law system: that judges should
build on previous decisions rather than claiming superior insight,
and that innovationshould be justified on the basis of what has gone
before.
* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. This
paper expands on the Cutler Lecture delivered at The College of William & Mary MarshallWythe School of Law. I am grateful to the members of the audience at the lecture for their
comments on the lecture, and to the participants in workshops at Harvard, Northwestern,
and the University of Chicago for comments on an earlier draft. Eleanor Arnold and Jeremy
Mallory provided excellent research assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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It is hard to overstate the significance of the Warren Court to
American legal culture. The Warren Court's decisions-most notably, but not exclusively, Brown v. Board of Education,5 which
declared public school segregation unconstitutional-changed the
way people thought about courts in general and the Supreme Court
in particular. In the first half of the twentieth century, courts were,
if anything, perceived as hostile to efforts to bring about equality
and social justice;6 after the Warren Court, the courts came to be
seen by many as the natural place for people to turn to achieve
these objectives. 7 The influence of the Warren Court has, moreover,
spread beyond the United States. The image of courts as the
institution with a special responsibility for the disadvantaged has
taken root elsewhere in the world, and the paradigm is the Warren
Court.'
Despite this record of success, though, the notion still lingers that
the Warren Court was essentially lawless. Morally visionary, yes,
at least on racial segregation;9 politically astute, perhaps, in sensing
the direction in which the nation was moving at the time;1" but
utterly deficient as a matter of legal craft. This view is held across
the spectrum, even by people who are broadly in agreement with the
Warren Court's objectives. Mainstream legal scholars during the
Warren Court years-including many who were politically inclined
to approve of the outcomes of the Warren Court decisions-relentlessly attacked the Warren Court in these terms. Alexander
Bickel, probably the most widely respected constitutional scholar
by Earl Warren"
of his time, accused "the Supreme Court headed ...
of having engaged in an "assault upon the legal order."'" Philip
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. For a general account, see ROBERT G. McCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
chs. 67-121 (4th ed. 2005).
7. See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and'Tomorrow, 28 IND.
L. REV. 309, 327-28 (1995).
8. See, e.g., The Right Honorable The Lord Woolf, The InternationalImpact of the Warren
Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 366-76 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
9. See, for example, the remark by a self-proclaimed critic of the Warren Court: "It was
a Court imbued with vision and courage at a time in our nation's history when vision and
courage were scarce commodities." Alex Kozinski, Spook of Earl:The Spirit and Specter of the
Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT, supra note 8,at 377.
10. This is a principal theme of LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (2000).
11. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120 (1975).
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Kurland's Foreword to the Supreme Court issue of the HarvardLaw
Review in 1964 was overtly contemptuous of the Justices' performance as lawyers;12 Kurland later derided Brown v. Board of
Education as "the self-licensing of the Court to recreate the equal
protection clause in its own image ... the beginning of the expansive
neo-natural law syndrome that allows the Justices to act not merely
as interpreters of the Constitution, but as its creators."'" Herbert
Wechsler, in one of the most famous law review articles of all time,
to segregation but nonetheless denounced
made clear his opposition
14
Brown as unprincipled.
The Warren Court had its defenders, but commentators like
Bickel and Kurland set the terms of the debate.1 5 The debate did not
stop, of course, with Earl Warren's retirement. Today the Warren
Court remains almost as much of a presence in public controversies
about the Court as it was a generation ago. The "lawlessness" of the
Warren Court-the view that the Warren Court Justices just
imposed their personal ideological predilections, that they had
engaged in an "assault upon the legal order by moral imperatives" 6 -- has become a rallying cry for those who applaud the
current, much more conservative, Supreme Court, and who think
that the current Court should, if anything, go even further in
undoing the Warren Court's work.' v More strikingly, perhaps, even
people who generally approve of the outcomes of the Warren Court
12. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: 'Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of the Government" 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 (1964) (referring to
"the absence of workmanlike product, the absence of right quality ... disingenuousness and
misrepresentation").
13. Philip B. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning" The School
DesegregationCases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309,
313, 316.
14. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 32-34 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the SegregationDecisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960). Black's argument is compelling and generally accepted as correct today, but the title
of the article demonstrates the extent to which the proponents of Brown were put on the
defensive by the critics.
16. See BICKEL, supra note 11.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 69-101 (1990); KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 13, 124 (2002); Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida
Fiasco, 19 NEW CRITERION 4, 8 (2001).
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decisions often agree-sometimes apologetically, sometimes
defiantly-that the law took a back seat to the need to end racial
segregation and to solve the other problems that the Warren Court
addressed.'" A typical criticism takes the form of equating today's
"conservative activist" Court with the "liberal activist" Warren
Court: "By ignoring constitutional text [and] misrepresenting
the conservative justices [of today's Court]
constitutional history ...
are guilty of precisely the kind of judicial activism that they rightly
criticized on the Warren Court."' 9
This widespread perception that the Warren Court was lawlessly
activist is wrong. But the perception is too widely held, by people
with varying political views,-to be dismissed as simple error. This
view of the Warren Court reveals something important, not just
about the critics and the Warren Court but about the nature of
American constitutional law.
The Warren Court did things, in the name of the Constitution,
that the text of the Constitution does not compel and that conflict
with the understandings of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution. To that extent, the critics are right. In fact, the
Justices of the Warren Court-unlike many others, before and
since--often made no claim that their decisions rested on the
original understandings of the Constitution or that those decisions
were dictated by the text. Anyone who believes that the text of
the Constitution and the original understandings simply are the
law will conclude-quite naturally, and whatever their political
inclinations-that the Warren Court was almost brazenly lawless,
18. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
217, 222 (1996) ("The balance of burden and benefit in the legal order of the day was not fairly
struck for African-Americans; the Warren Court's arguably lawless decision [in Brown]
inarguably pushed the balance toward greater fairness.'); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Interpretation,Character,and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 747, 758, 762 (1992) (arguing
that "the Warren Court's judgments were justified and validated by the Justices' prior
experience in national politics" and their "sound judgment" rather than any "theory of
constitutional interpretation"); see also Robin West, The Lawless Adjudicator,26 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2253, 2259 (2005).
19. Jeffrey Rosen, Dual Sovereigns, NEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1997, at 16-17 [hereinafter
Rosen, Dual Sovereigns]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Constitution Enact the
Republican Party Platform? Beyond Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY 177, 186 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) ("Republicans were right to attack the
undemocratic, overly ambitious rulings of the Warren Court.'); Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic,
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11.
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"ignoring constitutional text [and] misrepresenting constitutional
history."2 °
In fact, though, the Warren Court was lawyerly in a deep and
important sense. What the Warren Court understood and the critics
do not is that the text and the original understandings are not the
only sources of law, or even the most important sources of law,
including constitutional law. In its major constitutional initiatives,
the Warren Court was, in a profound way, a common law court.
That might seem incongruous, because the one' thing most people
agree on is that the Warren Court was innovative, and the common
law approach, rooted in precedent, is usually thought of as conservative and tradition-bound. But while the Warren Court did break
new ground in important ways, its major decisions were not as
severely cut off from tradition and precedent as one might think.
And the common law, for its part, is not as hidebound as one might
think. Many of the great common law judges-from seventeenth and
eighteenth-century English judges like Sir Edward Coke and Lord
Mansfield to twentieth-century American judges like Benjamin
Cardozo and Roger Traynor-are famous for their innovations.2 1 The
Warren Court belongs to that common law tradition.
The mistake of the critics who think the Warren Court was
lawless is that they look for constitutional law in the wrong place:
they think the Constitution is the text, and perhaps the history, and
little more. If you look only to those sources of law, you will not find
justification for what the Warren Court did. But if you recognize
that American constitutional law is more than that-that it is, in
large measure, a common law system, in which precedent plays a
central role-then the Warren Court is no longer lawless. It did not
simply make things up, or just decide cases in accordance with its
political predilections. The Justices of the Warren Court were not
just enlightened (or not) judicial activists who had a good sense (or
not) of how the winds of history were blowing. They were enlight20. Rosen, Dual Sovereigns, supra note 19, at 16-17.
21. On Coke, see, for example, JAMESR. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY:
COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 22-26 (1992); on
Mansfield, see, for example, C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 198-229 (1936); on Cardozo, see,
for example, ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDozo 247, 358 (1998); on Traynor, see, for example,
Mathew 0. Tobriner, Chief Justice Roger Traynor, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1970) ("[I1n
Traynor, the caution of the scholar is combined with the courage of the innovator ....
").
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ened, in my view, and they were in a sense activists, and they were
in many ways on the right side of history. But they were also in
their constitutional decisions squarely in the tradition of English
and American common law judges.
I will try to defend this claim by considering, principally, the
Warren Court initiatives that aroused the greatest contemporary
controversy and the most vehement charges of lawlessness: the
famous school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of
Education;22 the reform of criminal procedure, as typified by the
two most celebrated criminal procedure decisions-Miranda v.
Arizona,2 3 which required the police to warn suspects who were in
custody before questioning them, and Gideon v. Wainwright,2 4 which
required that counsel be made available to all defendants in felony
cases; and the reapportionment decisions, which revolutionized the
way state legislatures were elected.2 5 None of these cases can be
easily squared with the original understandings, and none is
dictated by the text of the Constitution. But each of them can be
justified as a faithful application of the methods of the common
law.2 6
I will begin, in Part I, by describing the common law approach.
That approach has well-developed theoretical premises and celebrated defenders. But the easiest way to understand the common
law approach is to see it in its native habitat, in one of the most
famous examples of common law innovation---Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 27 MacPherson
-the work of a consummate lawyer-takes an approach to the law
that is, I believe, parallel-uncannily so, in some instances-to what
the Warren Court did. After I discuss MacPherson,I will describe
the common law approach in more general theoretical terms. That
approach has had self-conscious practitioners and eminent theoreti22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. For an argument that the Warren Court used the common law method to make
important and innovative contributions to the protection of freedom of speech under the First
Amendment, see David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common Law Constitution,in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2002).
27. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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cal defenders for hundreds of years; it is the oldest tradition in
Anglo-American law.
Then I will show how the Warren Court, far from being a lawless
group of judges who just imposed their own political views on
society, was squarely within this ancient tradition. The Justices
were not relying on the text of the Constitution or on the original
understandings, in any form; if you look only there for law, the
Warren Court will appear lawless. The Warren Court Justices were
common lawyers. In Part II.A, I will discuss Brown, the Warren
Court's most celebrated decision but a decision that still rests on an
uncertain legal basis. In Parts II.B and II.C, I will discuss Miranda
v. Arizona" and Gideon v. Wainwright,2 9 two cases that epitomize
the Warren Court's decisions protecting the rights of criminal
suspects, which were perhaps the most widely unpopular decisions
of the Warren Court. In Part II.D, I will discuss the reapportionment cases. Brown and the criminal procedure decisions parallel
MacPhersonvery closely. The reapportionment cases present a more
complex set of issues, but they too are within the common law
tradition.
I. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH

A. Common Law Innovation in Action: MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.
Benjamin Cardozo was probably the most celebrated American
common law judge of the twentieth century,3" and MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.3 may be his most famous opinion. MacPhersonhas
become a classic in the common law canon: it has certainly had its
critics, but more often it has been held out as reflecting common law
reasoning in its most sophisticated form."
28. 384 U.S. 436.
29. 372 U.S. 335.
30. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990).
31. 111 N.E. 1050.
32. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-27 (1949); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis:
ConcerningPrdjudizienrechtin Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 205 (1933); Address by Karl
Llewellyn, in Report, The Status of the Rule of JudicialPrecedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 208
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MacPherson was what we would now call a products liability
action, but it arose at a time when it was not entirely clear that
consumers could ever sue manufacturers for injuries caused by
defective products. Specifically, the question in MacPherson was
whether an automobile manufacturer that sold a defective car could
be held liable, for negligence, for resulting injuries to a consumer,
when there was no contract directly between the manufacturer and
the consumer.3 3 The black letter common law rule-the so-called
"privity of contract" requirement-was that manufacturers were not
liable to any party with whom they had not contracted. Usually, of
course, this did not include the ultimate consumer.3 4
The privity of contract rule traced its origin to the English case
of Winterbottom v. Wright,3 5 decided in 1842. Privity of contract
was explicitly adopted in New York state in 1852 in Thomas v.
Winchester. 6 At the same time, though, New York and other
jurisdictions recognized an exception for "inherently dangerous"
objects (or, as it was sometimes put, "imminently dangerous" acts
of negligence).3" A plaintiff could recover for injuries caused by an
inherently dangerous object, even if there was no privity of contract.
Thomas v. Winchester itself involved such an object-a mislabeled
bottle of medicine that actually contained poison-and so, notwithstanding the privity rule, the plaintiff prevailed.3"
For the next sixty years, New York courts decided cases under
this regime, in which the privity requirement barred a products
liability action unless the product in question was "inherently
dangerous."3 9 The issue in each case was whether a particular
defective product was "inherently dangerous." In 1870, the New
(1940).
33. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
34. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS, §§ 15.5-6 (1999); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcUuRE OF TORT LAW, 284-88 (1987); see also Winterbottom v.
Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.).
35. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
36. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
37. E.g., Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909); Torgeson v.
Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1908); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 477 (1882); Kahner v. Otis
Elevator Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185, 188 (App. Div. 1904); Burke v. Ireland, 50 N.Y.S. 369, 372 (App.
Div. 1898); Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 20 N.Y.S. 523, 525 (App. Div. 1892), affd
mem., 41 N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1895).
38. Thomas, 6 N.Y. at 410-11.
39. See sources cited supra note 37.
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York Court of Appeals ruled that a flywheel in a machine was not
such an object. 4' The court explained: "Poison is a dangerous
subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is a dangerous instrument, as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle, or the like. '41 But the
flywheel, like "an ordinary carriage wheel, a wagon axle, or the
common chair in which we sit," was not inherently dangerous, so the
privity requirement applied and the injured plaintiff could not
recover from the manufacturer. 42 Three years later, in Losee v.
Clute, the plaintiff was injured by a defective steam boiler; 43 the
court decided that this, too, was an ordinary object, not an inherently dangerous one.44
Nine years after that, though, the Court of Appeals decided that
scaffolding was in the "inherently dangerous" category.45 In the next
two decades, intermediate appellate courts in New York concluded
that a defective building,4 6 an elevator,4 7 and a rope supplied to lift
heavy goods 48 all fell within the exception for "inherently dangerous"
objects. In 1908, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a bottle
of "aerated water" was inherently dangerous; 49 and finally, in 1909,
that a large coffee urn was inherently dangerous.50 All of these New
York cases purported to apply the accepted rule that a plaintiff had
to show privity of contract unless a product was inherently dangerous. The later courts did not question the authority of the earlier
cases,5 1 but they consistently ruled that the product was inherently
dangerous and so allowed the plaintiff to recover.
MacPhersoninvolved an automobile with a defective wheel; there
was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the manufac-

40. Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870).
41. Id. at 359.
42. Id.
43. 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
44. Id. at 497.
45. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
46. Burke v. Ireland, 50 N.Y.S. 185 (App. Div. 1898).
47. Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185 (App. Div. 1904).
48. Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 20 N.Y.S. 523 (App. Div. 1892), affd mem., 41
N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1895).
49. Torgeson v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1908).
50. Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909).
51. See, e.g., id. at 1064-65; Torgeson, 84 N.E. at 957-58; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470,
477-78 (1882); Kahner, 89 N.Y.S. at 188-89; Burke, 50 N.Y.S. at 371-72.
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turer of the automobile.52 The parties presented the issue as
whether the product was inherently dangerous.5 3 Cardozo's
celebrated opinion in MacPherson dispatched the privity requirement altogether. 54 The court held essentially that a negligent
manufacturer would be liable to anyone who could foreseeably be
hurt by its negligence. 5 Soon after MacPherson,the privity rule was
repudiated in many other jurisdictions, and consumers were
permitted to recover from manufacturers whenever they could
demonstrate negligence.56
Although Cardozo was very circumspect, he left little doubt that
he thought the privity requirement was a bad idea as a matter of
policy. He did not claim that his decision was dictated by the legal
materials alone.57 If his policy views had been the sole basis for the
holding in MacPherson, then Cardozo could fairly be accused of
doing what the Warren Court supposedly did. But while Cardozo's
policy views were an element of the reasoning in MacPherson,there
was more to MacPherson than that. What makes the case an
exemplar of common law reasoning is that Cardozo did not stop with
his policy views but instead drew on the lessons provided by the
earlier cases-two lessons in particular.
First, the earlier cases had demonstrated that the privity regime
was no longer workable. At one time, perhaps, it was possible to
distinguish between "inherently dangerous" objects and objects that
were-in the words of another foundational English case-part of
"the ordinary intercourse of life., 58 But by the time of MacPherson,
that distinction had broken down. Too many things were both
inherently dangerous and part of the ordinary intercourse of life.
52. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1053.
55. Id. ("If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.... [I]rrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.").
56. The next step-holding manufacturers strictly liable for defective products--occurred
a few decades later; it was also the product of a development resembling MacPherson.
57. Although the MacPherson opinion says only a little about the undesirability of the
privity requirement as a matter of policy, Cardozo's other writings leave little doubt that this
was a factor in his decision. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS 98-137 (1921).
58. Longmeid v. Holiday, (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 752, 755 (Ex.).
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Courts applying the distinction had decided that a steam boiler was
not inherently dangerous,5 9 but that a coffee urn6" and a bottle of
aerated water 61 were. MacPherson then presented the question of
how to classify an automobile.6 ' The question was unanswerable;
the governing rule no longer made any sense. Cardozo's conclusion
that the privity rule had to be discarded was supported not just by
his own views about good policy but by several decades' experience
under that rule.
The second lesson of the earlier cases was that although the
courts were purporting to apply the privity regime-and no doubt
generally believed that they were, to the best of their ability,
applying the privity regime-they were, in fact, gravitating toward
a new rule. Cardozo was able to claim, plausibly for the most part,
that the outcomes of the earlier decisions were consistent with the
principle that a manufacturer is liable for foreseeable injuries
caused by its negligence.63 That was true even though the reasoning
of the earlier cases was based on the privity regime and the
"inherently dangerous" exception. It was particularly true of the
more recent cases-the scaffolding,64 coffee urn,65 and aerated water
cases' -- which made much more sense if they were understood as
applications of the foreseeability rule rather than the "inherently
dangerous" exception that the courts purported to apply. Cardozo
was, therefore, in a position to say that his ultimate conclusionthat the privity regime should be discarded in favor of a simple
requirement of foreseeability-not only was good policy but was
supported by several decades' worth of decisions, which demonstrated both that the privity regime with its "inherently dangerous"
exception was not workable and that courts, perhaps without being
fully aware of what they were doing, were in fact, although not in
name, moving to a simple foreseeability requirement.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1892).
Torgeson v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1908).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054-55 (N.Y. 1916).
See id. at 1051-55.
Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
Statler, 88 N.E. 1063.
Torgeson, 84 N.E. 956.
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The combination of explicitly normative reasoning with a reliance
on the lessons of the past, along with a recognition that both are
indispensable, is what makes MacPhersona common law exemplar.
Cardozo did not claim that his views about the privity requirement
were irrelevant; that would have been disingenuous. But he also did
not claim the authority simply to turn those views into law. Before
he could do that, he had to show that his views were consistent with
what other judges had done. The conclusion that the privity regime
was unworkable and should be replaced by foreseeability was not
just Cardozo's alone; it was a conclusion that many judges had
reached, over several decades, even though those judges were not
fully aware that they were reaching that conclusion. Cardozo's
innovation consisted of making that conclusion, which had been
reached inexplicity in fits and starts, fully explicit.
B. The Premises of the Common Law
The MacPhersonopinion is famous, and it provides a particularly
graphic example of common law development. But there are
countless other examples of innovation in the law that followed
essentially the MacPherson pattern. The premises of Cardozo's
approach in MacPhersonhave, in fact, been around for centuries.
These premises of the common law were systematically articulated
by the great ideologists of the common law-Hale, Coke and (in
some of his writings) Burke-and they have been reiterated since,
in various forms.6 7
The first of these premises is a humility about-or, more neutrally, lack of confidence in-individual human reason.6 8 It is unwise
to try to resolve a problem without deferring to some degree to the
collected wisdom reflected in what others have done when faced

67. For the material in the succeeding paragraphs, see Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep.
377, 381 (K.B.) (Coke); EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.C.D.
Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790); MArITHEW HALE, REFLECTIONS BY THE LRD.
CHEIFE JUSTICE HALE ON MR. HOBBES HIs DIALOGUE OF THE LAWE, reprinted in 5 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 500 (1924).

68. See BURKE, supranote 67, at 251 ('We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on
his own stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the
individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations.").
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with a similar problem in the past.6 9 In more modern terms, the
common law approach reflects an understanding that human
rationality is bounded. The problems that judges confront are too
difficult for any one individual's reason to solve, and the solutions
that have evolved through earlier decisions provide at least an
important starting point. This is a claim about human rationality
generally, not just about judges, and the use of something like a
common law approach is, of course, not limited to judges. Many
other decision makers, both private and governmental, instinctively
or self-consciously follow precedent in making decisions.
The second premise, related to the first, is a kind of rough
empiricism. It is a mistake to approach complex issues, like those
involved in major constitutional cases, just on the basis of abstract
ideas about how the world should be. The problems are too complex
for that, and the theories are inevitably too simplistic. Rather than
trying to solve a problem by reasoning from abstractions, we are
better off looking to see how people, over time, addressed that
specific problem when it arose. If judges or people generally seemed
to gravitate toward solving a problem in one particular way, then
that is presumptively the best way to approach the problem, even
if the most appealing abstract theories would dictate something
different.
The third premise of the common law approach has to do
explicitly with innovation. The common law approach, as many of
its leading practitioners understood it, was by no means hostile to
innovation. It was also not hostile to innovation undertaken frankly
for reasons of what we would call justice, or fairness, or good policy
-"right reason" in the language of an earlier era. There is nothing
illegitimate about interpreting precedents in a way that candidly
promotes good results; there is nothing even necessarily illegitimate
about overruling precedents for that reason. What is required is
that such innovation be undertaken with due regard for what has

69. See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 381 ("[L]aws have been by the wisdom of the most
excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and continual experience, (the trial of
right and truth) fined and refined, which no one man, (being of so short a time) albeit he had
in his head the wisdom of all the men in the world, in any one age could ever have affected or
attained unto.").
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gone before; that is, with due regard for the limitations of abstract
reasoning and for the value of experience.
This means that innovation--change self-consciously undertaken
in order to bring about a morally better state of affairs-can be most
solidly justified if it is rooted in the past.7 ° This Burkean theme
echoes throughout the ideology of the common law. To be more
concrete: a change can best be justified if it is relatively modest and
if events in the past show, in accordance with rough common law
empiricism, that the change was already taking place in the way
that specific decisions were made, even if the change had not been
explicitly avowed. The best reason for discarding the old regime is
that in practice, even if not avowedly, the old regime was already
being discarded by many people who operated under it; and the best
reason for adopting a particular new regime is that that new regime
had already been adopted in practice, even though it was not fully
acknowledged.
It does not follow that all changes have to be modest and
incremental, although those kinds of changes are the easiest to
justify. A sharp, nonincremental change can be justified if you are
very confident that what has gone before is badly wrong. 1 But then,
too, it is best if you show that your conclusion about the need for
change is based not just on your abstract principles but on how the
old regime worked-specifically, how it was already being disregarded, and the new regime brought into play.
In these ways, a common law approach cautions against change
but does not preclude changes designed to bring about a more fair
or more just world. Moreover, and importantly, it is not just an
70. See BURKE, supra note 67, at 220 ("The science of constructing a commonwealth, or
renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a
priori....The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such
practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any
person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with
infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has
answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or of building it up
again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.").
71. See CARDOZO, supra note 57, at 98 ("Few rules in our time are so well established that
they may not be called upon any day to justify their existence as means adopted to an end. If
they do not function, they are diseased. If they are diseased, they must not propagate their
kind. Sometimes they are cut and extirpated altogether. Sometimes they are left with the
shadow of continued life, but sterilized, truncated, impotent for harm.").
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undifferentiated, go-slow caution, but an account of what kinds of
justifications are needed. You can be more confident about making
changes if you can use the past against itself, as it were: if you can
show that one lesson of the old regime is that the old regime was not
working in the way it was supposed to work.
These premises are on display in MacPherson;they are also on
display, to some degree, in the everyday practice of following and
distinguishing precedents. And they are surprisingly-and paradoxically, in view of the Warren Court's image-integral to the work of
the Warren Court.
II. THE WARREN COURT
A. Brown v. Board of Education
1. What Justifies Brown?
It is a commonplace now to say that any approach to constitutional interpretation, if it is to be taken seriously, must be consistent with Brown."2 If a theory about the Constitution leads to the
conclusion that Brown was illegitimate, then the theory must go.
But Brown's iconic character operates mostly in a negative way: it
means that certain forms of originalism must be dispatched. That
is because by common (although not quite universal) agreement,
Brown v. Board of Education is inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court understood as much when Brown was decided: after hearing argument
once in the case, the Court specifically asked for briefing on the
historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment and then, in
its opinion in Brown, essentially disavowed any reliance on original
intentions.7 3 That was a pretty clear indication that the Court did
not find much in the original understanding to support its conclusion.
Showing that Brown disproves originalism, however, does not tell
us what approach to constitutional interpretation Brown supports,
or why Brown is correct. To the extent there is a generally accepted
72. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. See id. at 486; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (ordering reargument).
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answer to that question, it is along these lines. The Fourteenth
Amendment enacted a commitment to equality. The understanding
at the time it was enacted was that equality did not preclude
segregation, but what was enacted was the principle of equality, not
that specific understanding about segregation. At the time of Plessy
v. Ferguson,74 the 1896 decision that infamously upheld a state law
mandating segregation, the Court (and most of the country) thought
that segregation was compatible with equality. By 1954, we knew
.better. We understood that separate was inherently unequal. On
this account, Brown is not really inconsistent with the original
understanding, once the original understanding is characterized the
right way. The disagreement with the drafters and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment concerns the implementation of the
principle, not the principle itself, and on that level we are not bound
by what the drafters thought. Or, in a variant of the argument, the
drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected that
we would not be bound at that level, so that when we disagree with
their conclusions about segregation, we are not really thwarting
their intentions.
This kind of argument is open to a familiar objection. If the
original understanding or the requirements of the text are characterized at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, then the question
of what is constitutional becomes, in practice, indistinguishable
from the question of what justice or good policy requires. If the
Fourteenth Amendment just enacts a principle of equality-without
enacting any more specific judgments about what kinds of laws are
consistent with equality-then the Fourteenth Amendment can be
interpreted to require equality of income or wealth, or it can be
interpreted not even to require racial equality. It all depends on
what, as a moral matter, equality requires. That approach gives
present day interpreters too much leeway. Few people think that
the Constitution imposes so few restraints.
To put the point another way, if, as seems likely, the generation
that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment made a judgment that
segregation was consistent with the Amendment, what basis do we
have today-or did the Court have in 1954-to disagree with that
74. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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judgment? Some arguments in defense of Brown seem to treat that
judgment as if it were a factual question. But while an understanding of the factual nature of segregation helps, the judgment
obviously has a crucial moral component. The claim that we knew
segregation to be inherently unequal in 1954, although we did not
know that in 1896, is not like a claim about a scientific or archeological discovery. It is a moral judgment, at least in part. The problem
then is to give an account of why Brown is not just an instance of
the Supreme Court's enforcing its moral judgments. It is not clear
that the prevailing understanding of Brown can give that account.
2. Brown and the Common Law Approach
Arguments based on the text and original understandings, then,
provide a very uncertain basis for Brown. Arguments based on
moral conceptions seem to acknowledge too little in the way of
constitutional restraint; in the end, they amount to saying that
Brown is right because it was morally right to end segregation. It
was morally right to end segregation, and it seems artificial to
pretend that that fact should play no role in justifying Brown. But
if that is all that can be said by way of justification, then it begins
to look as if the critics of the Warren Court were right. The Warren
Court may have done good things, but it was not doing law.
In my view, the justification for Brown is, in a word, that Brown
is MacPherson.Brown is lawful according to the methods of the
common law. This defense of Brown relies in part on the moral
wrongness of segregation, but it does not rely on moral arguments
alone; it crucially invokes arguments drawn from precedent. The
cases leading up to Brown-in a development that resembled the
line of cases preceding MacPherson-hadalready left "separate but
equal" in a shambles. Brown certainly did something that no
previous case had done, but Brown was the completion of a common
law process, not an isolated, pathbreaking act.
Plessy,7 5 decided in 1896, upheld a state law requiring railroads
to provide "equal but separate accommodations for the white, and
colored races."76 Rigid racial segregation in fact had shallower roots
75. Id.
76. Id. at 540.
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in the South than many once supposed; Jim Crow laws were not
instituted systematically after the abolition of slavery but rather
became widespread in the South only in the late nineteenth
century." The opinion in Brown made a point of noting that
"'separate but equal' did not make its appearance in this Court until
1896. ''78 That itself is relevant, under the common law approach: the
Court was not faced with as longstanding an endorsement of
segregation as might have appeared.
In the two decades following Plessy, the Court applied the
"separate but equal" principle in two cases involving education
without reconsidering its validity.7 9 The Court also rebuffed, on
narrow grounds, Commerce Clause challenges to laws requiring
segregation in transportation. 0 But at the same time the Court
sowed some of the seeds of the common law demise of "separate but
equal."
In McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., the
Court dealt with an Oklahoma law requiring separate but equal
railroad facilities.8 " This law permitted a railroad to have sleeping,
dining, and chair cars for whites even if it did not have supposedly
equal cars for blacks.8 2 The state defended the law on the ground
that there was essentially no demand from blacks for these
facilities.8 3 The Court rejected that argument and invalidated the
statute:
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, and if he is denied... a facility or convenience in the course
of his journey which under substantially the same circumstances
is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that
his constitutional privilege has been invaded.'

77. This was the argument made in C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (1957).
78. Brown, 347 U.S. at 490-91.
79. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of
Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
80. See, e.g., Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
81. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
82. Id. at 161.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 161-62.
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Three years later, in Buchanan v. Warley, the Court invalidated
a statute that forbade whites from living in a block where a majority
of the homes were occupied by blacks and vice versa.8" The suit was
brought by a white seller seeking specific performance of a contract
to sell to a black person.8 6 The Court's reasoning emphasized the
seller's right to dispose of his property as he saw fit, rather than any
right to be free from racial discrimination." The state defended the
law as a permissible regulation of property.' The tension with
Plessy is apparent: if separate but equal is a reasonable form of
regulation of one kind of economic transaction-the purchase of a
railroad ticket-why isn't the checkerboard law, arguably a version
of separate but equal, a reasonable regulation of real property?
Twenty years later, after the NAACP's legal campaign against
Jim Crow laws had begun, the seeds sown in McCabe and
Buchanan bore fruit. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, an
African American student was denied admission to the all-white
University of Missouri Law School.89 Missouri operated an all-black
state university, Lincoln University, that did not have a law
school.9 ° Instead, state law authorized state officials to arrange for
blacks to attend law school in neighboring states and to pay their
tuition. 1
The Court ruled that this scheme did not satisfy "separate but
equal."92 The Court refused to address arguments that out-of-state
opportunities for the student were equal to those in Missouri.9" 'The
basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other
states provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but
as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students
and denies to [blacks] solely upon the ground of color."' Because a
black resident but not a white resident would have to leave the state
for a legal education, the Court concluded, there was a denial of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 78-79, 81-82.
Id. at 74-75.
305 U.S. 337, 342 (1938).
Id.
Id. at 342-43.
See id. at 349-51.
See id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349.
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equal protection of the laws.9 5 The Court also relied on McCabe to
dismiss Missouri's argument that few African Americans in
Missouri sought a legal education.96 (Gaines was, apparently, the
only one who ever had).
There is a direct line from McCabe, decided in 1914, to Gaines,
decided in 1938, and a direct line from Gaines to Brown. Theoretically, after Gaines, a state might still have been able to satisfy the
Constitution by establishing a separate law school for blacks. But
giventhe limited number of black applicants, that was impractical-a circumstance that McCabe and Gaines said was irrelevant.
So, as a practical matter, Gaines left many states with no choice but
to admit blacks to graduate school. Perhaps more important, by
refusing to consider the argument that out-of-state law schools were
as good as Missouri's, the Court was, in effect, holding that the
provision of tangibly equal educational opportunities was not
enough to satisfy "separate but equal." The state had to treat blacks
and whites equally in some way that went beyond that. In this way,
Gaines suggested that symbolism mattered, not just tangible
equality. That principle was ultimately incompatible with "separate
but equal."
In the decade after Gaines, the Court did not decide any more
"separate but equal" cases, but it did invalidate racial discrimination in jury selection,9" hold the white primary unconstitutional,9 "
and rule that segregation in interstate transportation facilities
violated the Commerce Clause.99 In 1948, Shelley v. Kraemer held
that the Constitution forbade the enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants. 10 0 Also in 1948, in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, the Court
held that Oklahoma violated the Equal Protection Clause when it
excluded an African American from the University of Oklahoma
Law School because she was black.' 01 The Court ruled that the case
was controlled by Gaines.'0 '

95. Id. at 349-50.

96. Id. at 350-51.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
332 U.S. 631 (1948).
See id. at 633.
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Then, two years later, the Court effectively took away whatever
breathing room Gaines had left for "separate but equal." In Sweatt
v. Painter,the Court held that a law school Texas had established
for African Americans was not equal to the University of Texas Law
School. 103 The Court identified the substantial tangible inequalities
between the two schools but went out of its way to say that "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school" were "more important."'' 4 Of
course, the newly-established school could not possibly match the
University of Texas in those respects.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, °5 decided the same day as
Sweatt, turned entirely on intangible factors. The Court held that
"separate but equal" was not satisfied when an African American
was admitted to a previously all-white graduate school but was
made to sit in a certain seat in the classroom, by himself in the
cafeteria, and at a special table in the library. 10 6 The Court explained that these conditions harmed McLaurin's "ability to study,
to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students,
and, in general, to learn his profession."'0 7 After Sweatt, a state
could not satisfy "separate but equal" by establishing a new allblack graduate school because any such school, however equal
tangibly, could not possibly match the intangible assets that the
white school had. After McLaurin, a state could not segregate
African Americans within the established white school. What was
left? "Given what came before, the real question is why Brown
needed to be decided at all."'0 8
Observers at the time were aware that this progression of cases
had left "separate but equal" hanging by a thread. The certiorari
petition in Sweatt cited the earlier cases and asserted that they
fatally undermined Plessy. °9 The briefs in Brown, not surprisingly,
emphasized Sweatt and McLaurin."° The opinion in Brown
103. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
104. Id. at 634.
105. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
106. See id. at 640-42.
107. Id. at 641.
108. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 708 (1992).
109. See Petition and Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sweatt, 339 U.S.
629 (No. 667).
110. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 6-13, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No.
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supported its famous conclusion about the effect of segregation on
the "hearts and minds" of grade school students by quoting passages
from Sweatt and McLaurin that emphasized the importance of
intangible factors;'1 1 the Court in Brown said "[s]uch considerations
apply with added force to children in grade and high schools."" 2
Brown's citation of psychological research attracted much more
attention,11 3 but precedent plays a larger role in the opinion.
Of course, Brown was not received as merely the formal, more or
less inevitable culmination of a common law evolution. The Justices
themselves apparently did not think of Brown that way. Brown was
vastly more controversial than any of the earlier decisions. There
are many possible reasons for this: Brown involved grade schools
and high schools, not postgraduate education, and the explicit
rejection of "separate but equal" had tremendous symbolic significance. But on the question of the justification of Brown-as opposed
to the symbolic or political effect it had on the South and the
nation-Brown rested solidly on precedent.
In particular, Brown is strikingly parallel to MacPherson.In each,
governing doctrine-privity of contract with the exception for
inherently dangerous products, or "separate but equal"-had been
the established law for some time. For a while it was applied with
a degree of coherence; but then the coherence began to fray. The
decisions holding that certain arrangements were unequal, McCabe,
Buchanan, and Gaines, raised questions about exactly what would
constitute equality, just as the decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals about scaffolds and coffee urns,"" while making some sense
under the old rubric, raised questions about which products were
not inherently dangerous.
Like MacPherson,Brown was not dictated by the earlier cases.
But the decision in Brown could rely on the earlier cases to show, in
effect, that the formal abandonment of the old doctrine was no
revolution but just the final step in a common law development. The
Warren Court, of course, was influenced by its views about the
morality of segregation. That was entirely proper, though, because
1), 1954 WL 82041.
111. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
112. Id. at 494.
113. Id. at 494 n.1l.
114. See supranotes 45, 50 and accompanying text.
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those views--consistent with the common law's demand for humility
-were buttressed by the lessons of the past. Earlier Courts, trying
to apply "separate but equal," kept coming to the conclusion that
the particular separate facilities before them were not equal. In
concluding that separate could never be equal, the Warren Court
was, at most, taking one further step in a well-established progression. It was acting as a quintessential common law court.
B. Gideon v. Wainwright
Gideon v. Wainwrightwas not remotely as controversial as Brown
when it was decided, but it was in many ways emblematic of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution." 5 Gideon, which was
decided in 1963, held that state criminal defendants have the right
to appointed counsel in felony cases, even if they cannot afford to
hire a lawyer." 6 Like other Warren Court criminal procedure cases,
Gideon ruled that a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, in this
case the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that a criminal defendant
shall have "the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense,""' 7 applied
to the states."18 In doing so, Gideon overruled a precedent, Betts v.
Brady, decided twenty-one years earlier. Betts held that whether
counsel must be appointed in a state prosecution was to be decided
case by case, under the Due Process Clause, by determining
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the failure to
appoint counsel denied "fundamental fairness." ' 9
Like other Warren Court criminal procedure decisions, Gideon
could not be easily justified on the basis of original understandings.
There seems little doubt that the original understanding of the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was that it gave an accused the
right to have his own retained counsel, not the right to have counsel
appointed at the state's expense. 2 0 Even the Gideon opinion did not
115. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
116. See id. at 344.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
119. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 473 (1942).
120. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-29
(1955); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeitureof Attorney's Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to
Counsel of Choice: The ConstitutionalDilemma and How To Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765,
786, 789-90 (1989).

2007]

THE COMMON LAW GENIUS OF THE WARREN COURT

869

suggest otherwise. In any event, the Sixth Amendment was intended to apply only to the federal government, and nothing in the
history of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
suggested that that Clause was intended to create an across-theboard right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions.
If Gideon was not supported by the original understandings, and
required that a precedent be overruled, the question of justification
again arises: did Gideon rest on anything other than the Justices'
view that appointed counsel was a good idea? In fact, Gideon was
supported by a pattern of cases that resembled the cases preceding
Brown and MacPherson. The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Black, did discuss precedent, but not in this way; instead the Court
asserted that Betts itself was an "abrupt break" from previous
cases.'2 1 But Justice Harlan's concurring opinion criticized that
claim, and Justice Harlan seems to have had the better of the
argument.'2 2 None of the pre-Betts cases, fairly read, really suggests
an across-the-board rule requiring states to appoint counsel in all
felony cases.' 2 3
The better basis for Gideon was that-as Justice Harlan put
it-the case-by-case rule of Betts "ha[d] continued to exist in form
while its substance ha[d] been substantially and steadily eroded."' 24
The erosion occurred in several stages. Even before Betts, the Court
had suggested that there was an automatic right to appointed
counsel in any capital case. 2 ' The Court reiterated that suggestion
in dicta in 1948,126 and finally issued a square holding to that effect
in 1961.127
Meanwhile, in non-capital cases, the Court, while applying Betts,
progressively narrowed the circumstances in which counsel did not
have to be appointed. Between 1942, when Betts was decided, and
1950, the Court, on several occasions, sustained convictions of
defendants who were denied appointed counsel. 12 But at the same
121. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
122. Id. at 349-50 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 350.
125. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940).
126. E.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
674 (1948).
127. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
128. See, e.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728
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time the Court overturned convictions in several cases that
presented issues that, although not entirely routine, did not seem
exceptionally complex.'29 Then from 1950 on, the Court, still
applying Betts, reversed in every right to counsel case that came
before it. 3 ° In each case, the Court identified some occasion during
the proceedings when the defendant might have benefited from
counsel:' 3 ' an objection counsel might have made that the pro se
defendant did not;' 32 lines of investigation or argument that "an
imaginative lawyer" might have pursued; 3 3 or complex tactics that
13 4
might at least have mitigated the sentence.
In this way, Gideon follows the same common law pattern as
Brown and MacPherson.The Court in Gideon would have been able
to say, had it chosen to do so, that its decision was supported not
just by its own ideas about the importance of counsel but by two
decades' worth of experimentation with the rule of Betts. Betts had
supposed that there was a significant category of trials that were
fair even though the defendant who wanted a lawyer did not have
one; the experience of subsequent cases showed that Betts was
wrong-just as the parallel progression of cases showed that Plessy
was wrong in assuming that separate could be equal. That progression, rather than the text of the Constitution or the original
understandings, was the basis for the Court's decisions.
Like Miranda, the reapportionment cases, and even, in an
important sense, Brown, Gideon overturned a discretionary, caseby-case standard in favor of a more strict rule. This movement
toward rules was an important feature of Warren Court decisions in
general, although there are significant exceptions. Perhaps one
reason the Warren Court tended to adopt rules was that it expected
that those entities responsible for implementing its decisions(1948); Bute, 333 U.S. 640; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
129. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina,
363 U.S. 697 (1960); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
130. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(finding no sustained convictions after Quicksall, 339 U.S. 660).
131. Id. at 351 ('The Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence
of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services
of counsel at trial. In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality.").
132. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
133. Chewning, 368 U.S. at 447.
134. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957).
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states that formerly practiced segregation, police departments, trial
judges, and malapportioned state legislatures-would be resistant;
compliance with rules is usually easier to monitor than compliance
with a standard.
In any event, the choice of rules instead of discretionary standards does not affect the common law justification of the Warren
Court's major decisions. It is sometimes thought that discretionary
standards are characteristic of the common law. This seems to be at
least an overstatement; common law courts developed a number of
rules, and some prominent common law judges, notably Holmes,
thought that common law courts should try to reduce discretionary
standards to rules as much as possible 3 -thus anticipating, in a
sense, what the Warren Court did in constitutional law.
The central point, however, is not the nature of the new regime
that the Warren Court instituted, but its justification. In both
Brown and Gideon, the Warren Court was on solid ground in saying
that its choice of a new, more rule-like approach was justified not
just by its views of morality or good policy, but also by precedent. 3 '
The precedents, in seeking to apply the more flexible approach, had
ended up, in fact although not in name, following a rule.
C. Miranda v. Arizona
Mirandav. Arizona,137 much more controversial than Gideon and,
unlike Brown, still under attack in some quarters "--presents a
more complex case of common law development. In Brown and
Gideon (just as in MacPherson)the Court was able to say that its
decision did little more than ratify a development that had already
occurred.l"9 The old regime had broken down; it could not coherently
135. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) ("[W]e are dealing with a
standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once and for all
by the Courts.").
136. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491-94 (1954).
137. 384 U.S. 466 (1966).
138. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 104-11 (1985); Edwin Meese III, The Double
Standard in JudicialSelection, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 369, 375-76 (2007) ("In other words, [in
Miranda],the Justices openly read into the Constitution a meaning that they had specifically
said was not there just a few decades before.").
139. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
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be followed any more. In reality it had been replaced by a new
regime, and it only made sense to recognize as much.
The Court's decision in Miranda was more creative and, in one
respect, harder to justify. In Miranda, too, the old regime had
broken down. But it was not plausible to argue in Mirandathat the
new rules had already emerged in the cases and just needed to be
recognized.14 Still, the basic justification for Mirandais a common
law justification. The reason for the Miranda rules was not that
they were required by the text of the Constitution or the original
understandings, obviously, but it was also not just that the Court
thought they were a good idea. Rather, the justification was that
experience with the old approach showed that that approach was
unsound.11 The Court had to choose something to replace it. Those
conclusions-although not the actual Miranda rules themselveswere firmly supported by the common law-like development of
precedent.
This aspect of the background of Miranda seems fairly wellknown, better known than the comparable aspects of Brown and
Gideon. Miranda held that statements that were the product of
custodial interrogation of the accused could not be admitted in a
criminal prosecution unless the accused had been given certain
specific, now-famous warnings, and had waived the rights described
in those warnings." Before Miranda, the admissibility of statements made in response to interrogation was determined by a
"voluntariness" test derived from the Due Process Clause.'4 3 That
test asked whether the suspect's "will" had been "overborne" by the
interrogation.'4 4
The dissenting opinions in Miranda described the voluntariness
test as "workable and effective,"'4 5 but there was, by the time of
Miranda, abundant evidence that it was not, including earlier
140. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 467-68 (holding that until Congress or the states devise a
better approach, certain warnings must be provided as an interim requirement).
141. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 125 (1980).
142. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Subsequent cases held that statements obtained in
violation of Miranda could be used for certain purposes but those decisions are not the
concern here.
143. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000).
144. Miranda,384 U.S. at 534 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 513 (1963)).
145. See, e.g., id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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criticism by some of the Miranda dissenters. 4 ' The voluntariness
approach suffered from the usual problems of case-by-case approaches that examine all the circumstances: it led to unpredictable
and inconsistent decisions 11 7 and, therefore, offered insufficient
guidance to the police. 4 ' But the voluntariness test had other
problems as well. Unlike some other case-by-case approaches-in
4 9 for example-the
the obscenity cases before Miller v. California,'
voluntariness test depended on finding highly disputed facts. The
application of the test was, therefore, hostage to a "swearing
contest" between the police and the suspect.15 Moreover, even if the
facts were not in dispute, the voluntariness test, in any close case,
depended on an understanding of the atmospherics and the
nuances,
which could determine whether police tactics went too
51
1

far.

Even if all of that could be reconstructed adequately, the basic
inquiry of the voluntariness test was not coherently defined. The
Court was never able to give any standard for judging when an
interrogation tactic crossed the line from proper (indeed commendable) police work into illegal coercion. 5 2 There may have been
coherent approaches available, in principle. For example, the
approach advocated long ago by Wigmore-that the admissibility of
a statement should turn on whether it was obtained by means that
were likely to induce a false confession--can certainly be faulted on
various grounds, including the difficulty of reconstructing the facts,
but it would at least have provided some way to assess whether the
police acted improperly.' But the Court did not go in that direction;
in fact, in a 1961 decision the Court said that in assessing the
voluntariness of a confession the courts should not even consider
whether the tactics were likely to produce a false confession.' The
result was that the Supreme Court was repeatedly fragmented and
146. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (holding that the voluntariness
test would no longer suffice for statements elicited after the individual was indicted).
147. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440.
148. Id. at 440-41 & n.3.
149. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
150. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 445.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 507-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153. See 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 824, at 252 (3d ed. 1940).
154. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
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the lower court decisions showed no coherence. 155 The voluntariness
approach-like the "inherently dangerous" exception and the
"separate but equal" doctrine-simply could not be implemented
according to its own premises. The effort to implement it demonstrated the unsoundness of those premises.
For all these reasons, by the time of Miranda the Court was on
solid common law ground in saying that the voluntariness test
should be discarded. The destructive part of Miranda,so to speak,
rested on a secure common law justification. But the constructive
part-the requirement of specific warnings and a waiver-cannot be
justified on common law grounds, and the Court did not attempt
to do so.' 5 6 The best justification for that part of Miranda is that
something had to replace the voluntariness approach-the courts
could not just exclude every confession, or admit every confession-and the Supreme Court in Miranda did the best it could to
devise a replacement. Conspicuously, the Mirandaopinion justified
the rules themselves as a quasi-legislative way of preventing involuntary self-incrimination and invited legislatures to supersede the
Miranda rules with other approaches that would prevent coerced
self-incrimination. 157
It would certainly be possible to argue that the Court should have
adopted something different from the Mirandarules. It would even
be possible to argue that for all the weaknesses of the voluntariness
test, the need to obtain confessions is so great, and the possible
alternatives are such a hindrance to that effort, that the voluntariness approach is still better than Miranda.The characteristic attack
on Miranda,however, was different from that kind of relatively finegrained criticism of the merits of the decision. The characteristic
attack was that Miranda was an act of judicial usurpation, a case
in which the Warren Court went beyond the bounds of proper
judicial conduct. 5 ' That criticism is unjustified. The decision to
abandon the voluntariness test was thoroughly justified under the
common law approach. The next step-adopting the Mirandarules
themselves-could not be justified in that way, but that step was

155.
156.
157.
158.

See Miranda,384 U.S. at 440 & n.1.
See id. at 467-68.
See id.
See, e.g., sources cited supra in note 138.
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taken as a matter of necessity, and only provisionally, subject to
legislative change. 5 9
D. The Reapportionment Cases
Of all the Warren Court's important decisions, the reapportionment cases are the most difficult to fit within the common law
model. There was certainly no development of judicial precedent
paralleling the disintegration of the privity of contract rule or
"separate but equal." Baker v. Carr6 ' and Reynolds v. Sims, 6 '
perhaps more than any other major Warren Court decisions, were
a sharp break with past judicial decisions. The most immediate
precedent, Colegrove v. Green, famously ruled that the Court would
not enter the "political thicket" by considering claims that state
legislatures were malapportioned.6 2 And, like many other Warren
Court decisions, the reapportionment decisions found scant
support in original understandings. Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment-the basis for the decisions-apparently was not
intended to apply to voting at all, and there is no evidence that the
Framers of either the original Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment meant to outlaw malapportioned legislatures.'6 3
Nonetheless, the reapportionment decisions, highly controversial
at the time, quickly became uncontroversial. Today the basic
principle of "one person, one vote," whatever its difficulties in
application, seems beyond challenge as a general matter. This
relatively rapid acceptance of the core principle of the reapportionment decisions should suggest that those decisions were rooted in
something deeper than-as the dissenters charged at the time-just
the Court's idea of the best conception of democracy.'6 4
The best common law-like justification for the reapportionment
decisions is that they carried out a development that extended back
to the earliest days of the Republic: the inexorable, although not
159. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 467.
160. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
162. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
163. See ELY, supranote 141, at 118 & 236 n.37.
164. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590-91, 624-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker, 369 U.S. at
267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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uninterrupted, expansion of the franchise. Property qualifications
for voting were universal among the colonies. By the time of the
Revolution, some had been eliminated.'6 5 Then, in several waves of
reform in the early nineteenth century, property qualifications were
widely abolished, and by 1840, "universal" suffrage (limited to white
males) became the norm.'6 6 African Americans were nominally
enfranchisedby the Fifteenth Amendment, and in fact did vote in
many places, South and North, until the last decades- of the
nineteenth century.'6 7 The movement for women's suffrage gained
speed at the beginning of the twentieth century and culminated in
the Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920.168 Beginning in the
late 1950s, even before the Voting Rights Act, the vote was increas16
ingly restored to blacks in the border South.
This was not an uninterrupted march of progress; of course.
Blacks were massively disenfranchised at the turn of the last
century, and the Progressive Era was characterized by a variety 17of0
devices that were designed to limit the exercise of the vote.
Restrictions on voting by certain categories of individuals, notably
people convicted of crimes, remain important and controversial
today. Nonetheless, by the time of the reapportionment decisions,
the nation had, in the words of one historian, "achieve[d] ...
an
essentially unrestricted national franchise.''
This history served as the background for the reapportionment
decisions. Malapportionment did not literally disenfranchise
anyone, but the effect of malapportionment was to make some votes
count for more than others. That seems inconsistent with the
72
premises of universal suffrage, as the Court's opinions noted.
Needless to say, the reapportionment decisions were not compelled
by history alone. They were based, in part but crucially, on the
Court's views about the nature of democracy-both the view that
165. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 16-20 (2000).

166. Id. at 52.
167. Id. at 103-16.
168. See id. at 172-218.
169. See id. at 257-63.
170. See id. at 103-16.
171. Id. at 284.
172. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 & n.29 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
194 n.15, 244-45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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arbitrary population inequalities were wrong, and the well-known
argument that the political process was in many places incapable of
correcting malapportionment, so the courts had to intervene.17 The
point is, though, that those normative arguments, however strong
they are, did not stand alone. They were backed by the repeated
judgments of several generations, expressed through legislation and
constitutional amendments,' 7 4 that restrictions on the franchise
should be discarded in favor of political equality.
This background was an integral part of the justification for the
reapportionment decisions. The decisions would have been on
weaker ground, and the claims that the Court was illegitimately
overreaching'7 5 would have been significantly stronger, if the
decisions had not been a continuation of the long trend toward
establishing equality as the norm in political participation. That
trend-the series of expansions of the franchise-was the equivalent
of a series of precedents. It was precedent based not on judicial
decisions but on larger movements in society. That kind of precedent is harder to work with, and claims about a society's "traditions"
are notoriously subject to manipulation. But in this case the
characterization of the "precedents" as generally endorsing political
equality seems relatively straightforward. Although there were
deviations,'7 6 the dominant pattern was a series of decisions by
different generations to expand and equalize the franchise. Of
course, this nonjudicial precedent, like many lines of judicial
precedent, could have been read in more than one way. But the
Court's implicit reading-that the expansion of the franchise over
nearly two centuries supported the conclusion that malapportioned
legislatures were unconstitutional-was a legitimate reading.
On common law premises, decisions of this kind-whether made
by legislatures, constitutional conventions, or other political
processes-should also be allowed to justify an innovation like the
reapportionment cases. These past decisions, like judicial precedents, help overcome the bounded rationality problems that the
173. See ELY, supra note 141, at 117-25.
174. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX.
175. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590-91,624-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker, 369 U.S.
at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (declining to enter the "political
thicket" and reapportion voting districts).
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common law approach identifies, and they provide a broad base of
experience. They can, at least potentially, limit the kinds of innovations that may be undertaken. Indeed, many common lawyers
throughout history have viewed statutes as part of the common law;
not in the sense that judges are free to overrule them but in the
sense that judges should view them as the basis for further
extension, in the way that precedents might be extended. 177 The
reapportionment cases can be seen as taking this approach to the
various decisions-by state legislatures, state constitutional
conventions, and federal constitutional amendments (federal
statutes were not yet an important part of the picture)-to enforce
political equality.
When James Madison changed his mind and decided that the
Bank of the United States was constitutional--one of the most
striking instances of evolutionary constitutional intepretation in
our history, given Madison's prominence as a Framer-he did so
because of the "repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of
the validity of [the Bank] in acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications,
in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the
nation." 7 ' The same kinds of considerations that Madison cited
should be available to courts, and in the case of the reapportionment
decisions, they provide substantial support for what the Warren
Court did. As before, this is certainly not to say that the Court's
decision could be justified on this ground alone. Other arguments,
particularly the argument about the blockage in the political
process, were needed. 1 79 The Court's decision to adopt a strict, rulelike requirement of equality was, as many have noted,'8 0 the product
of institutional concerns; a less strict regime would have been more
difficult to implement. But that was, relatively speaking, a detail.
177. A classic example is Justice Harlan's opinion in Moragne v. States MarineLines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970). See id. especially at 390-91 ("Th[e] legislative establishment of policy
carries significance beyond the scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus
established has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in
matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law."). I am indebted to
Thomas Grey for this point.
178. James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815), available at
http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe_ 1815_0130_madison.
179. Baker, 369 U.S. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring).
180. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 141, at 124.
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The crucial decision was the decision that some form of equality in
voting was a constitutional requirement. That decision had a strong
precedent-based foundation, relying not just on what courts did but
on what other institutions decided.
CONCLUSION

Many questions about the Warren Court remain very much
subject to debate. Did its initiatives really accomplish very much, or
were they at most symbolic? Was its moral and political vision a
good one? Did it have the right conception of the role of a court in a
democracy? Was it just the product of the elite culture of a particular era, so that it is pointless to hold it up as a model? But the
notion that the Warren Court was lawless should be put to rest.
That notion may have gained currency for a number of different
reasons, among them the implicit premise that lawfulness must
consist of fidelity to an authoritative text or to the revered Framers.
The fundamental legal soundness of the Warren Court's major
decisions becomes clear, though, once one recognizes that there is
another conception of what it means to follow the law. The common
law account emphasizes humility, caution, and building on the past,
but without denying the value of innovation and the necessity of
making moral judgments. The common law approach can combine
these elements without becoming unsystematic. Judged by that
conception of lawfulness-which has as strong a claim as any to be
the right approach to American constitutional law-the reputation
of the Warren Court, on this count at least, should be secure.

